

Bank diversity and financial contagion

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This Paper

- ▶ **Question:** How do common asset holdings affect the resiliency of interbank networks?
- ▶ **Relevant** to understand the forces that drive financial contagion and banking crises.
- ▶ **This paper**
 - Interbank networks with varying homogeneity of portfolios
↳ exposed to liquidity shocks and fire sales
 - Resilience requires interbank claims: neither too concentrated nor too homogeneous
 - Diversity in banks' portfolios plays a key role in determining those thresholds

Main takeaway

- ▶ **Direct** (LL) and **indirect** (ML) losses when a bank defaults.
- ▶ Low interconnection [pins down π]
 - **Pros:** fewer banks affected
 - **Cons:** resilience of bank $i + 1$ is tested
- ▶ High interconnection [pins down $\bar{\pi}$]
 - **Pros:** losses diluted among many banks
 - **Cons:** shock spread across the network
- ▶ ML also affects $S_i = [\underline{\pi}_i, \bar{\pi}_i]$
 - If ML high for $i + 1 \rightarrow$ high π_i
 - If ML high for $j^*(i) \rightarrow$ low π_i

Figure: Complete Network





Figure: Ring Network



#1: Literature / exploring endogeneity

- ▶ Small theoretical literature linking asset holdings to the interbank market. Rogers and Veraart (2013), Acharya et al. (2012), Caballero and Simsek (2013), Leitner (2005).
↪ where does the paper fit in the literature?
- ▶ Focus on **endogenous relationship**.
↪ perhaps worth exploring with the model
- ▶ Closest would be Caillé and Raffestin (2019):
 - Banks with similar portfolios provide each other with favorable lending conditions (protection against fire sales).
 - Subsidy → rates down → clustered interbank network, particularly during crises.

#2: The model to the data

- ▶ Tractable framework that can be **calibrated** from banks' balance sheets, portfolios, and interbank exposures
 - Potential for **stress testing**?
 - Estimate $\underline{\pi}$, $\bar{\pi}$, $\Theta_{i,j}$, \vec{w}_i , ...
 - “Maximum idiosyncratic shock to bank i that the **network withstands**?”
- ▶ Roncoroni et al. (2021): data covering 26 large banks in the EU.
 - Similar conclusions from a generalized model of contagion.

#3: Policy implications

- ▶ Interesting to think about costs and benefits of **liquidity ratios**.
- ▶ But also Higher loss absorbency for SIBs, limits to large exposures (LEX), etc.
- ▶ Bail-outs
 - Lender of Last Resort (regulator, central bank)
 - Internal bail-outs (other banks in the network)

In sum

- ▶ Great paper! Very analytically rigorous.
- ▶ Endogeneity between common asset holdings and interbank networks?
- ▶ Data can help strengthening the results/mechanism.
- ▶ Opens the door to potential benefits from policy